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SOME COMPARATIVE REMARKS ABOUT THE
EFFICACY OF INTERNATIONAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
by Mark W. Janis*
This is the last formal presentation in what I think has been a very
successful series of papers. I would like to begin by simply saying what
so many of our visitors have said before, how grateful we are to all of
our friends at Ebtv~is Lordnd University for helping to organize such a
successful Conference. All of us from Connecticut have enjoyed work-
ing on the Conference as it has been developing over this year. We
certainly enjoy being here in Budapest and greatly appreciate your hos-
pitality. We are very much in your debt for everything that you have
done. I know I speak for all the Journal members and all the faculty
from Connecticut. Thank you!
I want to try in the time allotted to me to pull together some of
the strands not only from this afternoon's panel, but also from this
morning's panel and to see what we can do in terms of initiating a
useful general discussion. I think that perhaps my most useful role now
will be to introduce some of what I think are the central questions that
have been raised by the discussions today and let you as the audience
come back and deal with those questions and bring in your own
insights.
Rick Kay with whom I have co-authored a book on European
Human Rights Law knows that one of my favorite little quotes is a
saying from Montesquieu where he explains that he is not so interested
in what rules of law there are, because there are good rules of law
everywhere - he is interested in what makes good rules of law effec-
tive. One of the things motivating my own interest in international law
and constitutional law is not so much the formal rules of law, not what
is necessarily written down on paper, but what actually makes laws
* A.B., Princeton University; B.A., M.A., Oxford University; J.D. Harvard University; William
F. Starr Professor of Law and Director of International Legal Programs University of Connecti-
cut School of Law. This is a transcription of Professor Janis' remarks given on March 19, 1993.
CONNECTICUT JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW
work or not work. I think that all of the papers that we have heard
today have gone to this topic to some degree. Obviously, the efficacy of
law is a matter of special interest to those of us outside central and
eastern Europe as we watch the countries here begin to develop rule of
law states. I am sure, too, that it is a matter of interest in these coun-
tries as well.
As David Seymour I think meant to say when he began his presen-
tation, it has taken hundreds of years of trial and error in places like
England and America to achieve what we have presently achieved in
rules of law states. Of course England and America are far from per-
fect, but one of the reasons why Montesquieu in the eighteenth century
went to study England and its laws was to try to figure out why Eng-
land and not France had managed to protect individual liberties. He
came to the conclusion that it was not just rules of law that made a
difference but what he called the spirit of the laws. What Montesquieu
meant, I think, was the kind of spirit that people had towards the law,
the way in which the law invigorated the society, the way in which
society perceived law, judges, and the courts.
One of the things that struck me as I was listening to all of the
papers today is that it is easy to confuse democracy and law. I am
firmly persuaded that on some of the most important political issues of
the day, the law may be on one side and democracy on another.
Majoritarian rule may lead to one set of decisions; courts and law may
lead to another. This is a realization that I think the United States
recognizes with the doctrine of judicial review and the division of au-
thority among the President and the Congress, and the Supreme Court.
For example, three papers today addressing issues of minority
rights, which I think are almost always better protected by law than by
majoritarianism. By definition, democracy is based on majoritarian
rule. If minority rights mean anything, they mean the minority will be
protected from the majority. It may be a useful lesson that we can
draw from today's panels, that there is a need for a rule of law state,
that there is a need for judicial review, that there is a need for law that
can sometimes control the democratic process.
Hugh Macgill knows that whenever I give a lecture in Connecticut
to incoming students about what we offer in international and compar-
ative law, I always list all of the international and foreign law courses.
One of the things that I think amuses him is that I always put constitu-
tional law down on my list of our international law offerings.
One of the interesting things about the American Constitution
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that might be a model or a lesson as we look to Europe in the last
decade of this millennium is that the American Constitution is basi-
cally an exercise in international law making, that it was and is a
treaty of sorts. James Madison, being a good Princetonian, had had a
good background in history and politics and looked principally, I think,
at the Constitutions or the Treaties as they were then in the Nether-
lands and in Switzerland to try to find a model that he could use in
creating the new American Union. When you look for the very first
principal law book in the United States, Chancellor Kent's commenta-
ries, his four volume treatise on United States law, you will see that his
very first chapter is about international law. His second chapter is
about American Constititutional law which, even as late as 1820 or
1830, Kent saw as just one step down the international path. Kent saw
the Constitution as another form of treaty, this a treaty between many
sovereign states. It took the United States a bloody civil war to answer
the question of whether or not the Federal Union was a nation or a
collection of states and whether or not states should secede from the
Union.
I think there are some lessons to be taken from the Constitution
for Europe. One of them might be that Federalism and Constitutional-
ism are good ways of making problems more ambiguous, and making
things vaguer than they seem. I sometimes try to encourage my law
students not to always think of law's clarifying function. Sometimes the
necessity of law is sometimes to confuse things, to try to muddy the
waters. I think the American Constitution has been rather successful at
ambiguity. Sometimes it is very important to reach a stage of ambigu-
ity when you are dealing with problems that really cannot be solved. I
think that one of the successes of American law and American Consti-
tution has been our ability to ambiguously share power not only be-
tween the President, the Congress and the Supreme Court and between
the central government and the states, but also between the legal sys-
tem generally and the democratic politicians.
One sees in Europe not only the construction of parliamentary de-
mocracies in central and eastern Europe and successional constitutional
systems, but the emergence of legal systems like European Economic
Law and European Human Rights Law. I hope these international sys-
tems will be able to share some of the powers - muddy the waters if
you will - divide up what Professor Weisbrod referred to as state sov-
ereignty, perhaps not always in any clear fashion but in ways that solve
real problems.
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One of the things I found especially interesting in the first panel
was the way the very distinguished panelists, all of whom know a great
deal about European Human Rights Law, were very careful not to
commit themselves to definite answers about the powers of the Court,
or the Commission. My feeling about European Human Rights Law
and a little less about European Community Law is that these are sys-
tems in transition. Nobody here or anywhere probably really knows
what the roles for European regional legal institutions will be in five or
even ten years, but it may be that with respect to some of the minority
problems that we have discussed here today, perhaps a certain amount
of ambiguity will ultimately be necessary.
Montesquieu went to England to try to figure out what the English
were doing about law. We have many people here from Connecticut
who have come - I hope not only to preach, though we seem to be
dreadfully good at it - but also I hope to listen. In many ways
America is an inward looking kind of country. One of the things I think
we as United States lawyers can do is to try to bring lessons from other
countries to the United States.
Once again, for all of us, I want to thank you very much for your
hospitality. Thank you.
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